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The relationship between the European Community and the former European colonies 
– African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries - has been quite complex. The 
cooperation between them dates back to the origins of the Community1. The Treaty of 
Rome signed on the 25th of March 1957 made provisions for the association of the 
OCTs (overseas countries and territories), i. e. French colonies, with the European 
Community2. The first EDF (Development Fund for Overseas Countries and 
Territories) was set up at this stage to administer aid to the OCT’s countries3. By 
1960, the majority of the OCTs had gained their independence and in 1964 the 
Yaoundé Convention was signed4. In 1975, the Georgetown Agreement was signed 
creating an organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP 
countries)5. 
 
Since 1975, the Lomé Conventions’ policies formed the relationship between the 
European Union and the increasing number of the ACP-countries, nowadays 79. The 
Lomé Convention has been described as the most extensive collective agreement on 
co-opertion between the northern and southern countries6. However, despite the great 
appraisal of them by the European Union, in 2000 the era of the Lomé Conventions 
came to an end and was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement which represents an 
interim agreement that will be replaced by the Economic Partnership Agreements by 
2008.  
 
At the core of the Lomé Conventions were non-reciprocal trade preferences in favor 
of the ACP-countries. However, this policy has been abandoned, and further relations 
                                                 
1 EU,1996, “Green Paper on relations between the European union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st 
century – challenges and options for a new partnership”, http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/l-
vert/lv1_en.pdf#zoom=100.  
2 Dominique David, September 2000, “40 years of Europe – ACP relationship” in ‘the CourierACP-EU’, 
www.europe.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/courier/courier-acp.  
3 David, see footnote 2. 
4 David, see footnote 2. 
5 The Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP Secretariat), “The ACP Group”, 
www.acpsec.org/en/epa/index.htm/treaties.htm.  
6 Jerome Boulle, 1996, “An overview of the EU-ACP-Cooperation in the Indian Ocean”, Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, Working Papers on EU Development Policy No. 5. 
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between the ACP-countries and the European Union will be based on reciprocal 
commitments. This seems to be a peculiar development if one recalls that ACP-
countries are developing countries and more than the half of them ( 41 countries)  are 
at least-developed-countries (LDCs). Thus, the question arises how could such a 
gigantic economic power as the European Union expect the LDCs to shape their 
further mutual trade relations on a reciprocal basis and what are the reasons? What are 
alternatives for ACP countries in case they are not willing to accept the EPAs? Do 
they have any choice and a decisive power to influence the current development in 
their trade relations, or are they in a resigned position to accept anything which the 
EU dictates them? 
 
This paper aims to examine and evaluate the relationship between the EU and ACP 
countries from the Lomé Conventions to the current Cotonou Agreement, and, in 
particular, the new Economic Partnership Agreements which will affect the ACP 
countries by far more than the European Union. 
  
This paper is structured as following: At first, a short overview about the development 
of the trade relations between the European Community and later on the European 
Union and the ACP-countries will be shown. Further on, the main reasons for the 
changed development policy will be shown as well as the success of the Lomé era will 
be evaluated. In the fourth and fifth part the current situation of the trade negotiations, 
i. e. trade relations under the Cotonou Agreement, and the future Economic 
Partnership Agreements as well as their expected impact on the ACPs seen from the 
different perspectives – views and expectations expressed by the European Union on 
the one hand, and by the Non-Governmental-Organizations (NGOs) and the ACP 









1. Yaoundé and Arusha Conventions 
 
The predecessors of the Lomé Conventions were the two Yaoundé Conventions 
signed in the capital of Cameroon (1st of June 1964 to 1st of June 1969 and 1st of 
January 1971 to 31st of January 1975) and the Arusha Convention (1st of January 
1971 to January 1975)7.  
 
The Yaoundé Conventions covered 18 AASMs (Associated African States and 
Madagascar)8. They created an association between the former French colonies 
and the EEC9. Yaoundé contained no fundamental changes of access to the 
traditional markets for the French colonies, i. e. it was based on reciprocity, and 
thus, the trade access privileges were in effect a continuation of ‘existing 
legislation’10.  
 
The Conventions allowed the Yaoundé countries to export the small amount of 
industrial goods they manufactured, usually duty free, into the Community but 
with much less preference for exports of agricultural products11. To have allowed 
agricultural products in on a large scale would have undermined the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of high food prices for the protection of EEC farmers12. 
In return for this EEC’s preferential treatment for limited industrial exports to the 
Community the AASM countries were required to accept comparable exports 
from the Community countries13. 
 
                                                 
7 EU, “ACP: Lomé Convention”, http://homepages.uel.ac.uk/ben2417s/EUAid3.htm.  
8 David, see footnote 2. 
9 David, see footnote 2. 
10 Roman Grynberg, 1998, “The WTO incompatibility of the Lomé Convention trade provisions”, 
http://ncdsnet.anu.edu.au/online/online.htm. 
11  Ron Dorman, “European Union and the Third World; part 2, Setting up the Lomé Convention”,  
www.poptel.org.uk/against-eurofederalism/lome2.html
12 Dorman, see footnote 11. 
13 Dorman, see footnote 11. 
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The Arusha Convention governed trade links with four African States – Kenya, 
Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria14. 
 
2. Lomé-Convention I to IV 
 
2.1 Lomé I 
 
The Lomé Convention I replaced these previous agreements made by the 
original six EC members with former colonies. 
 
Protocol 22 to the Acts of Accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark 
offered 20 Commonwealth countries in Africa, the Carribean and the 
Pacific the possibility of negotiating with the Community the other 
organization of their future relations15. Other African States that were not 
member of the Commonwealth or ASMM were also given the same 
option16. This led to the First Lomé Convention which was signed on the 
28th of February 1975 between 9 European countries and 46 ACP countries 
and came into force on the 1st of April 197617.  
 
At a political level, it was proclaimed that each State has the right to 
determine its own policies; at a commercial level, non-reciprocal 
preferences were set up regarding ACP exports to the EEC18. Thus, for 
non-agricultural products the general rule was that products originating in 
ACP countries could be imported into the Community free of customs 
duties and charges having equivalent effect19.   
 
                                                 
14 EU, see footnote 7. 
15 EU, see footnote 7. 
16 EU, see footnote 7. 
17 ACP Secretariat, see footnote 5.   
18 David, see footnote 2. 
19 Jurgen Huber, 2000, “The Past, Present und future ACP-EC trade regime and the WTO”, EJIL, Vol. 11 No. 2, 428. 
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Furthermore, it introduced the STABEX system in order to compensate 
ACP countries for the shortfall in export earning due to fluctuation in the 
prices or supply of commodities20. The scheme was based upon the 
restitution, in part, for changes in output and export prices but only for 
those exports going to Europe21.    
 
Finally, Commodity Protocols favoring ACP exports were created in 
sectors such as sugar, beef and veal, and bananas22. 
 
 2.2  Lomé II 
 
The Lomé Convention II was signed on the 31st of October 1979 for a 
period of five years with 58 ACP countries and came into force on the 1st 
of January 198123. This Convention was, in global terms, a continuation of 
the previous one24. The new innovation was the SYSMIN system in order 
to help the mining industry of those ACP countries strongly dependent on 
it25. This was a mechanism of the same type as STABEX but relating to 
mining-product resources26. 
 
  2.3  Lomé III 
 
Lomé III was signed in December 1984 for a period of five years between 
10 European countries and 65 ACP countries and entered into force on the 
1st of May 198627. It shifted the main attention from the promotion of 
                                                 
20 David, see footnote 2. 
21 Grynberg, p. 23, see footnote 10. 
22 David, see footnote 2. 
23 EU, ‘From Lomé I to IV bis’, http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/body /cotonou/lome_history/.  
24 David, see footnote 2. 
25 EU, see footnote 23. 
26 David, see footnote 2. 
27 EU, see footnote 7. 
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industrial development to self-reliant development on the basis of self-
sufficiency and food security28. 
 
  2.4  Lomé IV 
 
The Lomé Convention IV was signed on the 15th of December 1989 for a 
period of 10 years between 12 European states and 68 ACP countries and 
came into force on the 1st of March 1990, revised in 1995 and expired on 
the 29th of February 200029. The review in 1995 led to the signatory of 70 
ACP countries and 15 European states30.  
 
The Lomé IV, just as the earlier Lomé Conventions, established unilateral 
preferences in favor of the ACP states while EC products did not enjoy any 
preferential access to the ACP markets31. The same Article contained a 
non-discrimination clause according to which the EC was not allowed to 
discriminate between ACP states in the field of trade32. A political 
innovation was the introducing of Human Rights clause33. Furthermore, 
the emphasis was given also to the democracy and good governance, the 
position of women, environmental protection, decentralized cooperation, 
economic diversification and the private sector34. These principles were 
essential for the cooperation between the EU and ACP-countries and thus, 
measures for the suspension of aid in the case of violation of these 
principles were introduced35. 
 
 
                                                 
28 EU, see footnote 7. 
29 Huber, p. 427, see footnote 19. 
30 ACP Secretariat, see footnote 5.  
31 Huber, p. 429, see footnote 19. 
32 Huber, p. 429, see footnote 19. 
33 David, see footnote 2. 
34 Jean Monnet European Centre of Excellence, University of Leeds, UK, “Bibliography:EU-ACP/developing 
world/poverty”, www.leeds.ac.uk/jmce/index.htm.  
35 ACP Secretariat, see footnote 5. 
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3. The evaluation of the success of the Lomé era 
 
The Lomé non-reciprocal system of trade preferences was supposed to increase 
ACP competitiveness and promote the diversification of those countries’ 
economies through privileged access for the majority of their products to the 
European market36. After many years’ experience of this system, the results have 
unfortunately not lived up to expectations set in this system in 197537. Only a 
handful of ACP countries – 10 at the most – have had the know-how or have been 
able to profit from these advantages38.  
 
As seen in the table 1, ACP countries’ share of EU imports has declined 
consistently39:  
 
Table 1 ACP countries’ share of EU imports in % (1976-94) 
1976  1980  1985  1990  1992  1994 
6.7  7.2  6.7  4.7  3.7  2.8 
 
Since 1994, there has been no increase of the ACP countries’ share in the EU 
imports40.  Although they are at the top of the pyramid of advantages offered by 
the EU to its development partners, paradoxically, the ACP countries are bottom 
of the list when it comes to exports to European markets41. Furthermore, a 
significant part of ACP exports to the EU, approximately 60 per cent, consists of 
only nine products42. Already regarded as minimal, the ACP countries’ share in 
world trade fell from 3.4 per cent in the beginning of the 1970s to 1.1 per cent 
                                                 
36 Kenneth Karl, November-December 2002, “Economic Partnership Agreements – hopes, fears and challenges”, 
‘the Courier ACP-EU’, No. 195, p. 21 f. 
37 Karl, p. 21, see footnote 36. 
38 Karl, p. 21, see footnote 36. 
39 Grynberg, p. 4, see footnote 10. 
40 Karl, p. 21, see footnote 36. 
41 Karl, p. 21, see footnote 36. 
42 Karl, p. 21, see footnote 36. 
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today although the ACP group has been significantly enlarged over the same 
period of time43.  
 
Many reasons for such a contra productive development are well known by now: 
 
1. First, the preferential margin – the difference between the normal, or most 
favored nation (MFN) tariffs and the (mostly zero) tariffs on ACP exports – 
kept falling as a result of global trade liberalization in GATT/WTO rounds44. 
These days, the ACP countries’ preferential margin stands at barely two per 
cent45.  
 
2. Second, a growing number of countries was receiving preferential treatment, 
sometimes more favorably than the Lomé preferences (e. g., the candidate EU 
member states or signature of FTAs with other trading partners respectively), 
or in some cases less favorably (e. g., the Generalized System of Preferences – 
GSP – and the preferences for the Mediterranean countries): this increased 
competition among exporters from different preference-receiving countries46.  
 
3. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the composition of ACP exports was 
such that only a relatively small share actually qualified for preferential 
treatment (38 per cent in 1977, and 35 per cent 10 years later)47. The 
explanation for this is that the ACP group exported many commodities on 
which a zero tariff was levied, whatever their origin48. Although some ACP 
countries started to export new products that effectively received preferences, 
                                                 
43 Arlene Alpha, Benoit Faucheux, Vincent Fautrel, Benedicte Hermelin, December 2005, “WTO and EPA 
negotiations: For an enhanced coordination of ACP positions on agriculture”, ECDPM Discussion paper No. 70, 
www.ecdpm.org.; Karl, p. 21, see footnote 36.  
44 Gerrit Faber, June 2004, “The Lomè Convention and the causes of economic growth”, www.agro-
maontpellier.fr/sustra/research-themes/eu-governance/papers/Faber/pdf.  
45 Karl, p. 21, see footnote 36. 
46 Faber, see footnote 44; Severine M. Rugumamu, 1999, “EU-ACP Partnership: an apparaisal”. 
47 Faber, see footnote 44. 
48 Faber, see footnote 44. 
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the quantities were too small to show up in the ACP market shares in the 
EU49. 
4. Fourth, the rigidity of some of the rules, particularly the rules of origin, have 
made it difficult to derive maximum benefit from the preferences and fostered 
dependency on traditional agricultural products50. In particular, the New 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) put in place in July 2005 led to 
further erosion of the ACP preferences51. The new GSP provides for a general 
system, a special system (GSP +) and the Everything But Arms Initiative 
(EBA)52: 
 
 The general system provides for a suspension of customs duties for 
“non-sensitive” products and a reduction of customs duties of 3.5 % or 
20 % for sensitive products.  
 
 The special system (GSP +) provides for a suspension of customs 
duties for almost all products, sensitive and non-sensitive products 
alike to countries which adopted sustainable development and good 
governance measures, i. e. human rights, workers rights, the 
environment and principles of good governance. 
 
 The EBA Initiative, entered into force in March 2001, grants duty-free 
access for all LDCs exports, without any quantitative restrictions, to 
the European market, except for arms and munitions. Thus, the 
advantages from which only ACP countries benefited in terms of 
access to the European market had been extended to non-ACP LDCs, 
and as a consequence for the LDC ACP countries was a further erosion 
of preferences in comparison to the non-ACP LDCs.  
 
                                                 
49 Faber, see footnote 44. 
50 Quaker Council for European Affairs, QCEA Short Report, May 1999, “Renegotiation of the Lomé Convention”, 
p. 12, www.qcea.org. 
51 Alpha and others, p. 21, see footnote 43. 
52 Alpha and others, p. 21, see footnote 43. 
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Moreover, the rules of origin do not allow the ACP exporters to cumulate 
inputs from non-ACP or non-EU sources, although it would be often more 
efficient to obtain inputs automatically from cheaper or nearer sources53. They 
therefore, affect the competitiveness of ACP exports and often appear to be a 
disincentive for investment and diversification54. 
 
5. Fifth, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, decided in June 2003, 
led to further erosion of the ACP preferences55:  
 
The CAP reform introduced a single payment per farm. The intention was to 
reduce the domestic prices of EU agricultural products, without threatening 
agricultural income. For the ACP countries the CAP had several negative 
consequences56: 
 
 a reduction in the domestic European prices on which ACP countries 
could rely in the framework of the sugar and bovine meat product 
protocols, and therefore a reduction in their export revenues; 
 
 an additional erosion of the preferential margins granted to the ACP 
countries in relation to the non-ACP countries. As indicated above, by 
reducing the guaranteed prices, the EU has less need of high customs 
duties to protect its market. It is therefore more willing to reduce its 
customs duties. A direct consequence of this reduction of European 
customs duties is an erosion of the preferential margins of the ACP 
countries; 
 
 an increased competition from EU imports on ACP markets given the 
reduction of European prices to the world levels. 
                                                 
53 A. Koning, 1994, “Challenges to ACP Trade with Europe after the Uruguay Round”, (Policy Manangement Brief 
No. 1), Maastricht: ECDPM, www.ecdpm.org.  
54 Koning, see footnote 53. 
55 Alpha and others, p. 17, see footnote 43. 
56 Alpha and others, p. 17, see footnote 43. 
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6. Furthermore, the structural problems inherent in the ACP economies which 
limit their competitiveness, the lack of investment and under-industrialization, 
combined with economic difficulties arising out of the international 
environment are further factors that led to the failure of the old system57.  
 
Conclusively, it should be stated that twenty-five years of cooperation have 
demonstrated that, albeit enabling developing countries to survive, aid cannot 
create development58.  
 
III. The WTO-Compatibility of the Lomé Conventions 
 
EU’s legal argument for its changed development policies towards ACP countries was 
the need to ensure the WTO compatibility of the future ACP-EU trade relations59. 
Since 1976, the question of the compatibility of the Lomé Conventions with the 
GATT, and later with the WTO-regime had always been an acute problem which 
emerged every five years in relation to the renewal of the Lomé regime.  
 
The main concerns were firstly, the trade preferences in the form of tariff rates that 
differed not only from the MFN rates that were available to GATT contracting parties 
but subsequently differed from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) rates 
that were available to other non-ACP developing countries and secondly, the trade 
preferences under the Commodity Protocols, i. e. the allocation of tariff quotas and 





                                                 
57 Karl, p. 21, see footnote 36. 
58 ACP Secretariat, see footnote 5.  
59 Among others, f. i. Huber, p. 430, see footnote 19. 
60 Grynberg, p. 5, see footnote 10. 
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1. Tariff rates  
 
1.1 Most-Favored-Nation Principle – Article I (1) GATT 
 
The trade preferences offered by the EU to the ACP countries violated the 
MFN-Principle under Article I (1) GATT which prohibits discrimination 
amongst trading nations. 
 
Article I (1) GATT states:  
 
“With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in 
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the international 
transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the method of 
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities 
in connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters 
referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III,* any advantage, favour, 
privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product 
originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately 
and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the 
territories of all other contracting parties”. 
 
According to the MFN-principle therefore, the European Union was obliged to 
grant equal tariff rates for the like products to any contracting country. 
However, the tariff rates granted to the ACP-countries differed significantly 
from the MFN rates granted to the non-ACP-countries. This represented a 
violation of the MFN-principle.  
  
1.2 Generalized system of preferences: a permanent waiver 
 
 21
The EU’s trade preferences towards ACP countries could not be justified 
under the GSP-system either. 
In 1964, the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNSTAD) started to look into ways and means of granting special trade 
preferences to developing countries61. In 1968 it recommended the 
creation of a “Generalized System Tariff of Preferences” under which 
industrialized countries would grant autonomous trade preferences to all 
developing countries62. In order to implement the system, a waiver from 
Article 1 of the GATT was required63. This waiver was granted on the 28th 
of November 1971, when GATT Contracting Parties adopted the so-called 
“enabling clause”64. The “enabling clause” states: 
 
“1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article I of the General Agreement, 
contracting parties may accord differential and more favourable treatment 
to developing countries, without according such treatment to other 
contracting parties. 
[…]” 
              
The enabling clause was adopted originally for a period of ten years, and 
renewed in 1979, for an indefinite period of time65. According to the 
clause, preferential treatment under the GSP has to be non-discriminatory, 
non-reciprocal and autonomous66. While discrimination in favor of 
developing countries is allowed, there should be no discrimination between 
them, except for the benefit of least developed countries (LDCs); 
moreover, preferences cannot be negotiated, nor can they be granted in the 
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66 ‘User’s Guide’, see footnote 61. 
 22
framework of an agreement under which beneficiary countries make 
mutual concessions67.  
 
Although the European Union’s development trade preferences under the 
Lomé regime were granted towards developing countries these policies 
still could not be justified under the permanent waiver. This is because in 
granting special preferences to the ACP countries under the Lomé regime 
the European Union discriminated against other developing countries 
which were non-ACP countries, as these trade tariffs were more 
preferential than those granted under the GSP. However, under the 
enabling clause the discrimination amongst the developing countries is 
prohibited. 
 
1.3 Special waiver 
 
Another way to legitimize the trade policies under the Lomé was the 
possibility to obtain a special waiver from the GATT obligations.  
 
Article XXV (5) GATT contains a special waiver. It states that:  
 
“In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this 
Agreement [GATT], the CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an 
obligation imposed upon a contracting party by this Agreement; Provided 
that any such decision shall be approved by a two-thirds majority of the 
votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more than half of the 
contracting parties […]”.  
 
However, until 1994 a waiver under Article XXV (5) GATT was not 
requested by the European Community (EC) and therefore, was not 
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granted68. The First Lomé Convention was then examined by a GATT 
working party in 1976 about its compatibility with the GATT-principles69. 
The EC alleged that the Lomé preferences towards ACP countries were 
GATT compatible70. Therefore, obtaining a special waiver was not 
necessary. The EC based its argumentation on Article XXIV in connection 
with Part IV, in particular Article XXXVI (8) GATT71. 
 
Article XXIV GATT allows building of free trade areas and customs 
unions. It states in its paragraph 5 that 
 
“[…] the provisions of this Agreement [GATT] shall not prevent, as 
between the territories of contracting parties, the formation of a customs 
union or of a free-trade area […], 
 
and further in its paragraph 8 that 
 
“(b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean a group of two or more 
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations of 
commerce […] are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the 
constituent territories in products originating in such territories […] 
 
(c) any interim agreement shall include  a plan and schedule for the 
formation of such a customs union or of such a free-trade area within a 
reasonable length of time.” 
 
Part IV of the GATT was introduced in 1966 and provides specific 
provisions for developing countries72. It declares that the contracting 
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parties recognize the need to treat developing countries more favorable in 
order to promote economical growth and development in these countries73. 
 
 
In particular, article XXXVI (8) states that: 
 
“The developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for 
commitments made by them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove 
tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less-developed contracting 
parties.*” 
 
The EC argued therefore, that the Community had liberalized for its part 
‘substantially all the trade’, as required by Article XXIV GATT, whilst as 
far as the ACP states were concerned, Part IV of GATT, and especially 
Article XXXVI (8) GATT had to be considered in conjunction and 
together with Article XXIV74, i. e. the ACP countries were not required to 
liberalize their trade as reciprocity was not expected. 
 
At the end of its examination the GATT working party was not able to 
reach a conclusion as to the compatibility of Lome I with the GATT 
provisions and it could note only that the parties to the Convention were 
prepared to supply information on a periodic basis and to notify any 
changes to the Lomé Convention75. 
 
2. The Commodity Protocols  
 
Apart of the duty free access of non-sensitive products to the European market the 
EU granted the ACP countries preferences for sensitive products under the 
Commodity Protocols, such as Beef and Veal, Rum, Banana and Sugar 
                                                 
73 Part IV of the GATT 1947 provisions. 
74 Huber, p. 429, see footnote 19. 
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Protocols76. In particular, the European trading regime under the Banana and 
Sugar Protocols had been challenged by several countries at the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body due to their incompatibility with the GATT, or WTO provisions 
respectively.  
The Dispute Settlement Body’s (DSB) decision in the Banana Dispute contributed 
considerably to the changes and the current development in the European policies 
towards ACP countries. The decision in the Sugar Dispute77 however, did not play 
any significant role in the current development in the EU-ACP relations. 
Following, the legal challenges of the EU’s banana regime brought in action by 
Latin American countries and the US will be examined closely.  
 
2.1 The Banana Dispute I78
 
The Banana Dispute firstly arose between five Latin-American banana-
producing countries (Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and 
Venezuela) and the European Union in June 1993. These countries 
initiated GATT dispute settlement proceedings due to the European new 
banana regime, which was established and came into force on the 1st of 
July 1993. The EU’s banana regime has resulted in three disputes at the 
GATT and subsequently the WTO as well as in the European Court of 
Justice79. Thus far three WTO Panels had been established to investigate 
the EU banana regime80.  
 
As part of the Lomé IV under the EC’s bananas regulation No. 404/93 
(Banana Protocol) the European Union granted the ACP countries 
preferences in accessing the European market with bananas. Protocol 5 of 
Lomé IV stated that ‘no ACP state will be placed in a less favorable 
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80 Grynberg, p. 7, see footnote 10. 
 26
situation than in the past or present as regards exports of bananas to the 
EU market’. The obligations under the Single Europe Act prohibited the 
creation of separate markets. Prior to the creation of the single market there 
were multiple marketing arrangements for bananas in Europe with most 
European countries importing bananas, i. e. each of the 12 EU member 
states had its own banana import regime. Germany operated on a free 
market system and had no import restrictions. The other 11 members 
imposed a 20 % tariff, and 6 members (France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Greece, and the UK) also applied quotas on bananas produced in Central 
and South America. These latter restrictions were designed to protect the 
EU market for bananas produced in former EU territories and in the ACP 
countries that entered duty free under the Lomé Convention. 
 
In July 1993, to assure the EU’s obligations in the Banana Protocol of the 
Lomé Convention and to assure that there was a unified European market, 
the EU created a system of tariff quotas81. The ACP states were granted 
access to the EU for some 875,000 tones of bananas duty-free. ACP 
imports in excess of this amount paid 750 ECUs per metric ton. Non-ACP 
bananas were subject to a duty of ECU 100 per metric ton on imports up to 
2 million metric tons, and ECU 850 on imports above that amount. Thirty-
three and a half percent of the 2 million metric tons of non-ACP bananas 
subject to the lower duty of ECU 100 was reserved for European 
marketing firms, most of which historically had marketed only ACP 
bananas.  
 
The complainants argued that the new European Banana regime violated 
Article I (1) GATT – MFN principle, as the EU discriminated against other 
contracting countries in favor of ACP supply (different tariffs depending 
on the origin of bananas), and furthermore Article III (4) GATT – National 
Treatment principle, as the EU discriminated in favor of EU sources 
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(reservation of 33,5 % of EU’s market access for EU producers). 
Furthermore, building of quotas is prohibited under the Articles XI, XIII 
GATT – prohibition of quantitative restrictions.  
 
Due to the first legal challenge in June 1993, in February 1994 the GATT 
Second Banana Panel ruled that the Lomé Convention’s Banana Protocol 
is not GATT consistent because it favors one group of developing 
countries over another82. The Panel found that there was discrimination in 
favor of ACP supply and this represented a violation of Article I (1) GATT 
(MFN-principle), and in the case of discrimination in favor of EU sources 
this represented a violation of Article III (4) GATT (National 
Treatment)83. The Panel concluded that the Banana Protocol was not a 
Non-tariff Measure, and hence not in violation of Article XI (1) GATT84. 
The allocation of quota did not violate Article XIII as traditionally tariff 
quotas (as opposed to import quotas) had never been deemed to be 
quantitative restrictions85. 
 
However, as was common under the GATT system that allowed parties to 
a dispute to block rulings against them the panel report was not adopted 
(the principle of positive consensus). Rather, the EU negotiated a so-called 
“Framework Agreement” with Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and 
Venezuela. The “Framework Agreement” increased and guaranteed the 
value of the export quotas of these countries, in return for their agreement 
to withdraw the GATT complaint and refrain from further GATT 
challenges until the 31st of December 2002. This agreement raised the non-
ACP quota to 2.1 million tons in 1994 and 2.2 million tons in 1995; 
lowered the in-quota tariff on Latin American bananas by 25 % to ECU 75 
per metric tons; and allocated specific export quotas to each of the four 
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Latin American signatories. However, the EU failed to come to an 
acceptable agreement with Guatemala which became one of the 
complainants in the Third Panel. 
 
2.2 GATT Working Party on Lomé IV 
 
In 1993 another working party examined the compatibility of Lomé IV 
with the GATT provisions86.  Soon after the completion of the Second 
Banana Panel report, the draft report of the Working Party on Lomé IV 
became available87. In the Working Party several of the Contracting 
Parties had argued that there was a need for a waiver under Article XXV88. 
The Community and the ACP argued again that nothing in Part IV GATT 
prohibited a Contracting Party from invoking Article XXXVI (8) in 
conjunction with Article XXIV, and that since the preferences granted by 
the Community were non-reciprocal, they complied with Article XXXVI 
(8) GATT89. For these reasons the Community did not consider that there 
was any necessity for requesting a waiver under Article XXV90. However, 
an increasing number of members of the working party strongly rejected 
the EC’s arguments91. They emphasized that Part IV of the GATT only 
endorsed treatment in favor of developing countries on a generalized 
basis92. They stressed that Lomé IV violated Most Favored Nation 
Treatment and that it would be only in conformity with the provisions of 
the GATT if the parties to Lomé IV were granted a waiver from their 
contractual obligations under the provisions of Article XXV GATT93.  
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Although the working party did not arrive at unanimous conclusions in this 
respect, in October 1994 the Community and the ACP states which were 
parties to GATT requested a waiver under Article XXV (5) from the 
obligations of the EC under Article I (1) GATT, without prejudice to their 
position that Lomé IV was entirely compatible with their obligations under 
Article XXIV GATT in the light of Part IV94. The reasons for the request 
of a waiver were in part the widely held view that if it were not granted the 
Lomé Convention would come under closer scrutiny following the entry 
into force of the GATT 1994 rules95. Moreover, given the legal precedent 
that had been established by the Second Banana Panel Report, it was 
almost inevitable that other aspects of the treaty would come under closer 
scrutiny – following the Banana Protocol Decision the government of 
Brazil was considering a legal challenge to the Sugar Protocol of the Lomé 
Convention96. The EU was perfectly aware that it was not required to 
adopt the Second Banana Panel under the GATT rules but the Commission 
was keenly aware that without a waiver prior to the coming into force the 
new WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes it would face similar challenges to Lomé97. 
Moreover, given the failure to come to terms with Guatemala over the 
Banana Framework Agreement, a waiver was clearly necessary in order to 
avoid further complaints98.  
 
Unlike under the GATT system the new Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
under the WTO allows for the creation of Panels and also created an 
Appellate Body99. Thus, the creation of Panels could not be blocked by the 
contracting parties any longer100. Furthermore, the decisions of the 
Appellate Body are fundamentally different from that of the panel under 
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the GATT 1947 dispute settlement rules101. Article 17 (14), Annex 2 of the 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (DSU) states: 
 
“An Appellate Body report shall be adopted by the DSB and 
unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless DSB decides 
by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report within 30 days 
following its circulation to the Members. […]”. 
 
Thus, under the new system rulings could not be blocked by parties to the 
dispute unilaterally – the principle of positive consensus did not apply any 
longer – but rather the principle of negative consensus applied, i. e. in 
order to block the ruling the consent of all contracting parties was required, 
which was difficult to obtain. Moreover, the power of the DSB was 
increased further by its power to recommend compensation in the event 
that recommendations of the Panel or Appellate Body are not implemented 
expeditiously102. 
 
The waiver from Article I (1) GATT was granted by the decision of 
Contracting Parties on the 9th of December 1994 until the expiry of Lomé 
IV, i. e. 29 February 2000103. The terms of the waiver stated: 
 
“Subject to the terms and conditions set out hereunder, the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the General Agreement shall be waived, until 
29th February 2000, to the extent necessary to permit the European 
Communities to provide preferential treatment for products originating in 
ACP States as required by the relevant provisions of the Fourth Lome 
Convention, without being required to extend the same preferential 
treatment to like products of any other contracting party.” 
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However, the waiver was granted, and requested, only as far as the 
provisions of Article I (1) GATT were concerned, and not with regard to 
other provisions of GATT104. In particular, the decision adopted by the 
contracting parties unanimously did not provide for the waiver from 
Article XI or Article XIII GATT provisions105. 
 
Thus, it was thought that by obtaining a waiver from its obligations under 
the Article I (1) GATT the European Union had the required legitimacy for 
granting non-reciprocal trade preferences to the ACP countries, in 
particular that the trade preferences under the Banana Protocol in favor of 
ACP countries were justified. However, this was not the case.   
 
2.3 The Banana Dispute II106
 
In 1996, the US, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico jointly 
challenged the EU’s banana regime again despite the granted waiver in 
violation of Articles I, II, III, X, XI, and XIII. The EU’s case as presented 
to the Panel relied heavily on its assertion that the banana regime was a 
legitimate part of the Lomé Convention for which the EU had a WTO 
waiver; the claimant’s response was that the banana regime was not 
covered by the Lomé Convention. 
 
As a parallel move the European Union was threatened by the US to 
impose retaliatory sanctions on EU products to the value of revenue Latin 
American bananas would otherwise have accrued107.  
 
                                                 
104 Huber, p. 430, see footnote 19. 
105 Grynberg, p. 13, see footnote 10. 
106 Patterson, see footnote 78. 
107 QCEA Short Report, Appendix, p. 8, see footnote 50. 
 32
The WTO Panel report, issued on the 22nd of May 1997, found that the 
EU’s banana import regime was discriminatory and as such was 
inconsistent with the GATT 1994, the WTO agreement on Import 
Licensing and the GATS. The Panel further found that the Lomé waiver 
waived the inconsistency with GATT Article XIII, but not inconsistencies 
arising from the licensing system108.  It came to the conclusion that the 
Lomé waiver should be interpreted so as to waive not only compliance 
with the obligations of Article I (1) GATT, but also compliance with 
Article XIII GATT (tariff quotas), because that would be necessary in 
order to give real effect to the waiver109.  
 
On the 11th of June 1997, the European Communities notified its intention 
to appeal certain issues of law and legal interpretations developed by the 
Panel110. The Appellate Body mostly upheld the Panel findings and 
furthermore, found additional violations of the GATT.  
 
In particular, the Appellate Body disagreed with the conclusion of the 
Panel that the Lomé waiver covered discriminatory quotas and reversed 
that finding111. According to the Appellate Body, the wording of the Lomé 
waiver was clear and unambiguous. It waived only the provisions of 
Article I (1) GATT and, although Articles I and XIII GATT were both 
non-discrimination provisions, their relationship was not such that a waiver 
from the obligations under Article I GATT implied a waiver from the 
obligation under Article XIII GATT112. 
  
IV. The Cotonou Agreement 
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Following the WTO decisions in Banana Dispute, a long-term examination was 
undertaken within the Community (known as Green Paper113) as to how a future trade 
regime with the ACP could be envisaged which would be ultimately WTO-
compatible, without the necessity for requesting a waiver for an indefinite period of 
time114. Also, the failure of the Lomé Conventions to provide the ACP countries with 
the expected economic growth and welfare led to the re-consideration of the 
development policies between the EU and ACP countries115. Furthermore, obtaining a 
waiver became very costly for the EU because additional concessions had to be 
granted to the potential opponents of the waiver. The EU has made it very clear that 
the ACP no longer carry sufficient political weight in Europe that warrants putting up 
with this hassle any longer116. The essential economic justification for the Lomé 
Convention’s trade provisions was to assure national sources of supply for European 
markets; however, from the European perspective there was no longer a perceived or 
potential commodity shortage that could not be dealt with within the context of the 
global market117. 
 
The Green Paper, adopted by the European Commission on the 20th of November 
1996, launched a wide-raging debate on the future of ACP-EU relations118. Numerous 
solutions were considered. Broadly the options included119: 
 
 creating a free trade area (consistent with Article XXIV (5) GATT), 
 generalizing the system of Lomé trade preferences to other non-ACP 
countries, 
 seeking a waiver (under Article XXV (5) GATT). 
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The debate resulted in the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement, and thus, in the 
EU’s favored option of creating free trade areas with ACP countries in consistence 
with Article XXIV (5) GATT.   
 
The 20-year Cotonou Agreement was concluded in June 2000 between 15 European 
states and 77 ACP countries120. It provides for a shift from the system of non-
reciprocal trade preferences to reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs)121. The Cotonou Agreement proposes that ACP countries enter into EPAs 
with the EU, either as regional groups (regional economic partnerships – REPAs) – 
the option favored by the EU – or individually122. 
 
The Cotonou Agreement provides for a preparatory period from 2000 to December 
2007123 during which the successor regime, the so-called Partnership Agreement 
between the Community, its Member States and the ACP States, will be negotiated124.  
The planned EPAs are to go into effecting January 2008125, and their implementation 
is to be phased in gradually over the subsequent 10 to 12 year period126.  
 
The Cotonou Agreement maintains the non-reciprocal trade preferences in favor of the 
ACP countries, and therefore, a new WTO waiver was necessary127. Such a waiver 
was granted the EU at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha128 however, 
on the condition that the EU would request no more dispensation and that this second 
dispensation was a provisional pending total compliance by the EU-ACP trade regime 
with the WTO rules129. The opponents of the waiver, such as Thailand, Indonesia and 
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the Philippines were granted tariff-free quotas for tuna by the EU in order to secure 
this second waiver130. It will expire on the 31st of December 2007131.  
 
Under the Cotonou preferences, all imports of manufactured goods from the ACP 
countries enter the EU duty-free but are still restricted by what are fairly demanding 
rules of origin for small low income economies132. Many ACP agricultural products 
also enter the EU duty-free except for 990 tariff lines covering agricultural and 
processed agricultural products produced in the EU, which are granted only small 
tariff preferences133. The most valuable preferences for Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) 
have been those extended to a few traditional primary exports – sugar, meat, and fish 
– some of which are still governed by separate Commodity Protocols134. However, the 
Cotonou Agreement notes that the Commodity Protocols with the ACP countries will 
need to be reviewed in the context of the EPAs135. 
 
According to the Cotonou Agreement, in addition to market access in manufactured 
goods, agricultural products and services, EPAs will cover many trade-related areas, 
including competition policy (Art. 45), intellectual property rights (Art. 46), 
standardization and certification (Art. 47), sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS, 
Art. 48), trade and environmental considerations (Art. 49), trade and labor standards 
(Art. 50), consumer protection (Art. 51), food security (Art. 54) and investment 
(Art.75)136. 
 
V. Economic Partnership Agreements 
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The EPAs will provide for reciprocal liberalization of substantially all trade137.  They 
will constitute free trade areas in the sense of Article XXIV GATT and a waiver will 
no longer be needed138.  
 
According to the European Union the EPA process has four important objectives139:  
(a) replacement of unilateral preferences with reciprocal free trade arrangements 
in order to make the EPAs WTO-compatible;  
(b) asymmetry: differentiation in the treatment of LDCs and non-LDCs; 
(c) regional integration; and  
(d) coordination of aid and trade. 
 
(a) Reciprocal free trade arrangements and WTO compatibility: 
 
In order to make EU-ACP trade relations compatible with WTO rules, the 
Cotonou Agreement provides for replacing the existing relationship of unilateral 
preferential access by ACP countries to EU markets with reciprocal free trade 
agreements between the EU and the ACP countries140. That is, not only will the 
EU provide tariff-free access to its markets for ACP exports, but ACP countries 
are expected to provide tariff-free access to their own markets for EU exports141. 
 
The EPAs, like other free trade agreements between developed and developing 
countries, will be governed by WTO’s Article XXIV GATT142. Article XXIV 
GATT requires that the countries entering into a reciprocal free trade agreement 
liberalize, i. e. elimination of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce, 
“substantially all the trade” within a “reasonable length of time”, without 
distinguishing between developed and developing countries143. However, Article 
XXIV GATT does not contain any legal definitions on how much trade 
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liberalization is meant by “substantially all the trade”, and thus gives way to 
interpretation. “Substantially all the trade” is interpreted by the EU to mean 90 % 
or more of trade, and 10 years is considered to be a “reasonable length” of time 
except in special cases144. 
 
However, the EU understands this 90% threshold as an average of the trade 
between the partners145. In this context it means that as long as the average trade 
liberalization between the parties contains 90 % in total the developing countries 
can liberalize less, while the EU liberalizes more146. In the context of EPAs, the 
popular understanding is therefore, that if the EU liberalizes 98% to 100% of its 
trade, the ACP countries will have to liberalize only 80%-82% of their trade to 
meet the EU’s criterion of an average of 90% for WTO compatibility147. 
 
(b) Special and differential treatment:  
 
In addition to reciprocity, a second guiding principle of the Cotonou Agreement is 
differentiation148. Article 35.3 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement states: 
 
“Economic and trade co-operation shall take account of the different needs and 
levels of development of the ACP countries and regions. In this context, the 
Parties reaffirm their attachment to ensuring special and differential treatment for 
all ACP countries.” 
 
(aa)  Least Developed Countries
 
The EU recognizes that the trading relationship need not to be symmetrical, 
in other words what is expected of the trading partners may vary according 
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to circumstances and ability to participate149. The last part of Article 2 of the 
Agreement states:  
 
“[…] differentiation and regionalization: cooperation arrangements and 
priorities shall vary according to a partner’s level of development, its needs, 
its performance and its long-term development strategy. Particular emphasis 
shall be placed on the regional dimension. Special treatment shall be given 
to the least-developed countries. […]”  
 
Part 1 of Article 85 then adds that:  
 
“The least-developed ACP States shall be accorded a special treatment in 
order to enable them to overcome the serious economic and social 
difficulties hindering their development so as to step up their respective rates 
of development.”  
 
Thus according to the Cotonou Agreement, the LDCs are not being expected 
to have to open their markets to EU exports as fast or as much as the non-
LDCs in order to maintain their preferential access to the EU markets150. 
Furthermore, for all LDCs the EC committed itself to grant a duty-free 
access for essentially all products as from 2005 at the latest151, which was 
realized by the introduction of the EBA initiative in 2001. 
 
(bb) Non-Least Developed Countries
 
Regarding the non-LDCs the EU acknowledges that participation in 
Regional Free Trade Areas might not be in the interests of some ACP 
countries152. It might be impossible for others, given such constraints as their 
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geographical location, market orientation or current level of economic 
development153. Thus, for those ACP states not classified as least developed 
countries (LDC) and which are not in a position to negotiate an EPA, 
alternative trade arrangements will need to be developed154.  
 
The Cotonou Agreement explicitly provides an alternative option for 
countries ‘that decide they are not in a position’ to negotiate EPAs155.  
Article 37.6 of the Cotonou Agreement states: 
 
“In 2004, [the EU] will examine all alternative possibilities, in order to 
provide [ACP] countries with a new framework for trade which is equivalent 
to their existing situation and in conformity with WTO rules”. 
 
While the date formally indicated in Article 37.6 Cotonou Agreement is 
2004, the ACP and the EU agreed to let the 2004 deadline for discussing 
alternatives pass and to be prepared for discussing such request whenever 
appropriate156. However, to date the EU has failed to provide alternatives to 
the EPAs. According to the EC they were not provided yet because no ACP 
country has so far requested the EU to examine alternatives to EPAs157.  
  
(c) Regional integration:  
 
A third objective of the EPA process is to promote outward oriented regional 
integration among the ACP counties and limit the “hub and spoke” effect that 
bilateral free trade just between the EU and individual ACP countries could 
have158.  
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In the case of free trade agreements like the EPAs when a hub country or region 
(the EU) signs FTAs with various small countries like those in SSA (the spokes) 
and the latter do not sign FTAs among themselves, the hub country benefits 
because it has free access to all markets whereas the spokes only have free access 
to the hub market159. This “hub-and-spoke” effect increases the incentive for 
exporters to invest in the hub country, rather than in the spokes, in order to serve 
all of the markets160.  
 
Traditionally, the 77 ACP countries have been divided into 6 broad regional 
groupings: the Caribbean, the Pacific, and four loosely defined African sub-
regions – Western, Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa161. The EPAs are 
intended to establish free trade areas between the EU and each of these regional 
EPA negotiating blocs, the precise composition which was to be determined by 
the ACP countries themselves162.  
 
(d) Coordination of trade and aid:  
 
The fourth objective of the planned EPAs is to more effectively coordinate trade 
and aid163. The EU is one of SSA’s largest aid donors164.  
 
Summarizing, it can be said that for the European Commission EPAs will foster 
development mainly through trade liberalization and foreign investments165. There 
will be standard gains for the ACP countries, such as the increased market access to 
the EU, reduced prices of EU imports for ACP consumers and more competition 
among the producers166. In addition, by building on the ACP regional integration 
                                                 
159 Hinkle/Newfarmer, p. 8, see footnote 126.  
160 Hinkle/Newfarmer, p. 8, see footnote 126. 
161 Hinkle/Newfarmer, p. 8/9, see footnote 126. 
162 Hinkle/Newfarmer, p. 9, see footnote 126. 
163 Part IV of the Cotonou Agreeement; Hinkle/Newfarmer, p. 9, see footnote 126. 
164 Hinkle/Newfarmer, p. 7, see footnote 126. 
165 San Bilal and Francesco Rampa, November-December 2005, “The Development Dimension of EPAs and 
International Aid for Trade”, Trade Negotiations Insights, Vol. 4 No. 6, www.ictsd.org/tni. 
166 Bilal/Rampa, see footnote 165.   
 41
processes EPAs should contribute to the establishment of effective regional markets 
thus attracting and stimulating investment, a necessary condition of sustainable 
development167. EPAs will not only address tariff but also non-tariff barriers, and 
technical barriers to trade, as well as a number of trade-related “behind the border” 
measures (such as trade facilitation, competition, investment ect.) thus, increasing the 
benefits from trade168. EPAs will not only cover trade in goods and agricultural 
products, but also in services169. With its comprehensive coverage the new partnership 
should therefore also contribute to lock in policy reforms in the ACP countries, 
increasing the relevance and credibility of their regional integration process, as well as 
facilitating their integration in the world economy170. Last but not least, EPA 
negotiations should be accompanied by discussions on the development assistance 
available for the ACP countries, as well as possible complementary support by other 
donors171. 
 
VI. Concerns and critics 
 
The European Union proclaims that EPAs will stimulate economic growth and 
development in ACP countries and enable them to integrate better into the world 
trade. The Cotonou Agreement states that the objective of Economic Partnership 
Agreements is “to reduce poverty by supporting the sustainable development and the 
gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy”172. However, the 
Non-Governmental-Organizations as well as the ACP countries themselves express 
concerns that the reciprocal trade liberalization between rich developed countries and 
poor developing countries is a major threat to poverty reduction and development173, 
and many campaigns were initiated in order to stop this development174. 
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These concerns were expressed publicly, for the first time, by the ACP group during a 
hearing in the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee in September 
2005175. The ACP Committee of Ambassadors’ Trade Committee Chairman, 
Namibian Ambassador Katjavivi, who led the delegation of ACP Ambassadors to the 
meeting, informed parliamentarians that there has been little progress in addressing 
fundamental issues of concern to the ACP in a number of areas, related in particular to 
the development dimension and regional integration priorities in negotiations with the 
EC to date176. The Ambassador noted however, that several EU Member States, 
including the United Kingdom, seem to understand ACP concerns about the need for 
more developmental support to address supply side needs and to provide sufficient 
transition periods for liberalization177.  
 
NGOs and ACP countries’ governments see significant problems and negative effects 




One of the biggest concerns by the NGOs is the full trade liberalization 
proclaimed by the European Union. EPAs are premised on the assumption that 
indiscriminate trade liberalization and market deregulation are best for achieving 
development178. EU claims that removing barriers to trade leads to increased 
competition, lower prices, transfer of knowledge, increased efficiency, and 
ultimately, overall positive welfare gains and economic development179. However, 
NGOs fear that EPAs would follow the indiscriminate approach employed during 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs), i. e. opening markets without considering 
the development needs of individual countries180. Indeed, there is little evidence 
that market liberalization is to be associated with trade growth and poverty 
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reduction but in contrary, it can lead to more poverty, as seen in the 80s and 90s 
due to the ‘Washington Consensus’181. Furthermore, the NGOs argue that the 
impact of trade liberalization under EPAs would be deeper than that experienced 
under SAPs because SAPs involved tariff reduction not elimination that is 
foreseen under EPAs182. They claim that without some form of infant industry 
protection it is hard to see how African manufacturing in its nascent stage and 
already trailing the rest of the world will survive competition from European 
corporations183. Premature trade liberalization can contribute to deindustrialization 
in developing countries, characterized by a decline in manufacturing, the collapse 
of industries, and a loss of jobs and ‘tacit knowledge’184.  
 
In contrary to the proposed full trade liberalization, the Africa Economic Report 
2004185 argues that the successful integration of Africa into the world economy 
will require better-educated and healthier workforces, improved economic and 
political governance, better quality infrastructure, and dynamic trade policies, 
including gradual and targeted trade liberalization. Trade liberalization needs to be 
timed and sequenced carefully: there are different optimal degrees of openness at 
different stages of development186. If market opening occurs, it should not be 
dictated by arbitrarily devised timetables, but according to the developmental 




The major change to the previous agreements is the reciprocity. As noticed above, 
under the Lomé the developing countries were entitled to export their products 
duty free to the European market however, at the same time they were not obliged 
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to open their markets for duty free European imports.  EPAs however, are based 
on reciprocal commitments.  
 
NGOs see big problems with reciprocity. Reciprocity between developing and 
developed countries can be very damaging to the former because the asymmetries 
in economic size mean that developing countries have to make relatively larger 
concessions and bear disproportionately high costs of adjustment than the 
developed countries188. For African countries to liberalize 90 % of all trade with 
the EU within a 10-12 year period would require them to open all but 10 % of 
their markets to EU products within a decade, regardless of the structural 
weaknesses or the macro-economic conditions of their economies189. 
 
NGOs blame that most developed countries have historically made use of trade 
safeguarding measures to help their economies take off, and they still use 
concealed protectionism mechanisms that distort the free-competition system, as is 
the case in the agricultural sector190.  
 
The EU argues that existing imbalances can be addressed through ‘asymmetrical 
liberalization’, which would mean a differential approach to product coverage and 
to the pace and timing of liberalization191. However, NGOs argue that proposals 
for longer timeframes, combined with lower percentages of liberalization for 
ACPs, do not solve the problem192. “Many ACP countries are poorer today than 
they were two decades ago and could be in worse shape in 10 or 20 years. Yet the 
EU insists on tying reciprocity to pre-determined timelines and insists that a 
development component would only come in parallel with opening of markets”193. 
   
3. The ‘hub-and-spoke’ effect 
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The NGOs fear the ‘hub-and-spoke’ effect194. 
 
As noted above, to prevent the ‘hub-and-spoke’ effect the EU proposes to sign 
FTAs with groups of ACP countries and not separate agreements with each ACP 
country. However, there are doubts that the ‘hub-and-spoke’-problem will be 
significantly diminished195. According to the EU’s proposal there should be six or 
seven Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs) signed between the ACP-countries 
themselves and thereafter these RIAs-blocks will sign the EPAs with the EU196. 
However, these six or seven RIAs will represent spokes, four or five of which are 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, as they will open their markets to the EU but not among 
themselves, the EU however, will open its markets to each of the RIAs-blocks197. 
Furthermore, the EU is already becoming the hub of a massive hub-and-spoke 
structure with its linking up to the East with the Europe Agreements, to the South 
with the Euro-Med Agreements, and to the West with Mexico and MERCOSUR 
(Agreement between EU and South American countries)198. This expansion raises 





NGOs blame that the European Commission has taken advantage of its political 
and economic power to dictate the pace and terms of EPA negotiations to ACP 
countries, because many ACP countries have weak trade negotiating capacities 
and are heavily dependent on EU aid200. Trade with the EU is very important 
especially for Africa201. The EU is a far more important market for Africa than the 
                                                 
194 Actionaid, p. 28, see footnote 115. 
195 Schiff/Winters, p. 8, see footnote 120. 
196 Schiff/Winters, p. 8, see footnote 120. 
197 Schiff/Winters, p. 8, see footnote 120. 
198 Schiff/Winters, p. 8, see footnote 120. 
199 Schiff/Winters, p. 8, see footnote 120. 
200 Actionaid, p. 29, see footnote 115. 
201 Actionaid, p. 4, see footnote 115.   
 46
US or Japan202. For historical reasons, the EU is sub-Saharan Africa’s single 
largest trading partner, receiving about 31% of Africa’s exports and supplying 
40% of its imports203. In contrast, trade between Africa and the EU is much less 
important for the EU than it is for Africa because the EU’s economy is much 
larger than the economies of the SSA countries204. Thus, the impact on the EU of 
free trade arrangements with Africa is likely to be quite limited and much easier 
for the EU to adjust to than for Africa205. The differences in economic size and the 
relative importance of EU-SSA trade to the two sides would give the EU a much 
stronger bargaining position than SSA if the negotiations were conducted strictly 
on commercial terms206. Most ACP countries are severely disadvantaged by the 
small size of their delegations; their inability to participate effectively in meetings; 
and opaque processes that leave them marginalized and assumed to be part of the 
consensus if they are not physically present to argue their case207. 
 
5. Europe’s offensive interests 
 
The NGOs believe that the EU wants to open up the ACP countries’ markets 
further to European companies. The EU is pushing offensive interests - such as 
services - in the EPA negotiations, against the explicit wishes of the ACP and with 
no clear developmental benefits208. 
 
NGOs take the view that the replacement of the Lomé regime with free trade areas 
is a massive risk for the ACP but the EU has nothing to lose209. ACP countries are 
unlikely to gain better access to the European market but will see their local 
industries put under severe strain by competition from cheap European imports, 
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often subsidized and of poor quality210. The European Commission’s own impact 
assessment notes that, ‘EPAs could lead to the collapse of the manufacturing 
sector in West Africa’211. 
 
 
6. The timescale 
 
The timescale offered for establishing regional FTAs is another difficulty212. The 
idea that they could be established successfully within the next twenty years 
ignores according to NGOs the vast political and economic differences which 
obtain between regions, and within countries themselves213. ACP countries can 
point to the length of time it has taken to establish the EU as a regional market: it 
took Europe nearly half a century to complete the elimination of all internal 
barriers to trade in goods214. Yet the EU is now demanding that African countries 
not only eliminate internal barriers amongst themselves, but also all barriers to 
trade with the EU within 10-12 years215. The extent to which developing countries 
liberalize their trade should be based on their individual development and 
economic needs, and not determined by arbitrary timeframes and product 
coverage216. The year 2017 (an end-date quoted by Commission officials) appears 
to be optimistic if many of the ACP countries are not to suffer from the loss of 
their existing privileges217. 
 
7. High adjustment costs/Lost of fiscal revenues 
 
The NGOs claim that the EPAs will cause high adjustment costs regarding the loss 
of fiscal revenues for ACP countries, as trade taxes constitute a large share of total 
                                                 
210 Bond, see footnote 209. 
211 Bond, see footnote 209. 
212 QCEA Short report, p. 5, see footnote 50. 
213 QCEA Short Report, p. 5, see footnote 50.  
214 Actionaid, p. 11, see footnote 115. 
215 Actionaid, p. 11, see footnote 115. 
216 Stuart, see footnote 187. 
217 QCEA Short Report, p. 5, see footnote 50. 
 48
tax revenue in these countries218. Some of the more peripheral countries are 
dependent on customs duty as a source of income for around one third of their 
national revenue - in some cases the proportion is far higher -, which would be 
removed with the creation of FTAs219. For example, in Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, 
and Uganda, trade taxes represent 40 per cent, 49 per cent, and 48 per cent of total 
government revenue respectively220.  
 
On one hand, tariff revenues will be lost in the RIAs among ACP countries221. On 
the other hand, EPAs with the EU will result also in a significant loss in fiscal 
revenues222. Thus for example, Cape Verde and the Gambia stand to lose 19.8 per 
cent and 21.9 per cent of their national incomes respectively; and Ghana and 
Senegal stand to lose 10 per cent and 11 per cent223. Estimated fiscal revenue 
losses for Kenya are 12 per cent224. Such large decreases in fiscal revenue would 
substantially harm ACP countries’ budgetary capacities to finance key 




There are serious concerns about the expected impact on wages and 
employment226. If existing industries have to compete with imports, the result 
might be unemployment not automatically offset by growth of employment in 
export sectors227. This would seriously affect the poor228. If no new opportunities 
will be created for the poor, they could be considerably worse off than before229. 
 
                                                 
218 Schiff/Winters, see footnote 120.  
219 QCEA Short Report, p. 5, see footnote 50; Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
220 Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
221 Schiff/Winters, see footnote 120. 
222 Schiff/Winters, see footnote 120. 
223 Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
224 Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
225 Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
226 Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
227 Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
228 Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
229 Szepesi, p. 10, see footnote 136; Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
 49
9. The Singapore Issues 
 
The European Commission’s proposals for EPAs also seek to include agreements 
on investment, government procurement and competition policy, issues often 
known within the WTO as the ‘Singapore issues’230. The EU argues that an 
investment agreement would attract much-needed foreign direct investment (FDI) 
into these countries231. NGOs agree that FDI could aid Africa’s development if 
managed responsibly, but disagree with the European Commission’s policy of 
greater deregulation of African investment regimes and indiscriminately opening 
up African markets to European corporations232. This would remove the policy 
tools that governments might use to ensure that investment is socially responsible, 
economically productive and consistent with national development goals233. 
 
Three of the four Singapore Issues (investment, competition, transparency in 
government procurement) - of which the EU has been the strongest proponent – 
were dropped from the Doha work program as a result of continued opposition by 
ACP countries, in alliance with other developing countries234. However, these 
issues are concluded into the EPA negotiations again235. In effect, ACP countries 
will have to “re-fight a battle” already won in the WTO, but from a weaker 
bargaining position236. The Cotonou Agreement contains a strong commitment to 
ownership of local policies237. Article 4 says: 
 
“The ACP States shall determine the development principles, strategies and 
models of their economies and societies in all sovereignty. […]” 
 
Further on, Article 19.1 states that: 
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“[…] cooperation framework and orientations shall be tailored to the individual 
circumstances of each ACP country, shall promote local ownership of economic 
and social reforms […]” 
However, according to NGOs, it is difficult to see how these principles and 
objectives are compatible with the EU’s proposals on the Singapore Issues238, as 
ACP countries are strongly opposed to these issues but EU insists on their 
inclusion into the negotiations.  
 
NGOs claim that in insisting on these issues under the EPAs despite of being them 
already rejected at the WTO, the EU is pursuing a self-interested market access 
agenda without due consideration to the development needs of African 
countries239. Agreements on these issues would create one-sided rules that would 
disproportionately benefit EU investors at the expense of domestic African 
investors, leading to the economic exploitation of African producers, workers, 
small-scale and medium-level processors240. It would also curtail the policy 
choices available to African governments in pursuit of their development 
objectives241. Furthermore, NGOs claim that there is no absolute evidence that 
FDI necessarily precede economic growth242. Interestingly, countries such as 
China and Malaysia, with comparatively illiberal investment regimes have been 
amongst the largest recipients of FDI during the last decade243. This suggests that 
the level of a country’s per capita income, its rate of growth and its physical and 
human capital infrastructure are more critical determinants of FDI than free 
markets or legal and regulatory frameworks244. There is therefore, no compelling 
reason why investment agreements under EPAs will lead to increased FDI flows 
to Africa245. On the contrary, such agreements, including increased rights for 
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European corporations to repatriate profits abroad, could increase capital flight 
from the continent246. In particular, Africa has already a higher proportion of 
wealth held overseas by residents than any other region of the world247. Capital 
flights amount to a significant economic loss for Africa, constituting a diversion of 
domestic savings from investment and a loss of fiscal revenue (through loss of 
taxation)248. 
 
Furthermore, NGOs argue that the economic history demonstrates that non-
discrimination or national treatment, i. e. the idea that a country cannot or should 
not systematically discriminate between domestic and foreign investors, is not a 
successful development strategy249. During the early stages of their development, 
many of the now developed countries did not adhere to this principle250. They 
used a range of instruments, including limits on foreign ownership, insistence on 
joint ventures between foreign and local firms, local employment and performance 
requirements to build up their national industries251. Infant industry protection is 
necessary, if not sufficient, for developmental success252. Every now-developed 
country adopted such a strategy; every successful developing country since 1945 
followed such a path253. By denying African countries this same right, developed 
countries are hampering their industrial development254. 
  
The UK government supports the initiative to remove the Singapore Issues from 
the EPA negotiations, unless these issues are specifically requested by a regional 
grouping255. 
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10. Agricultural sector 
 
The agricultural sector is vital for the ACP countries256. Agriculture is the 
mainstay of many African economies and livelihoods, accounting for the bulk of 
national income, providing livelihoods for 89-90 % of the population, and 
supplying about 20 % of Africa’s merchandise exports257.  
 
Observers fear that the European Union intends to remain the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). This means on the one hand, that the EU’s overall 
spending on the CAP will remain at around 40 bn per year until 2013258, and thus, 
African farmers will not be able to compete with the European farmers due to the 
European support for the latter. The average EU farmer receives 100 times more 
in agricultural support than the average annual earnings of an African peasant 
farmer259. 
  
On the other hand, some authors allege that by using its interpretation of Article 
XXIV GATT the European Union retains the possibility to maintain protected 
sectors in FTAs, which are for example sensitive agricultural products and 
processed food products260.  
 
European Union has signed several FTAs with, for example, Mediterranean 
countries or South Africa, Mexico and Chile respectively261. An analysis of these 
various FTAs signed by the EU shows that the EU excludes a certain number of 
important products from the free trade principle262. The protection and aids from 
which certain agricultural products benefit at the national level within the EU are 
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undoubtedly the decisive factor in the choice of the exceptions263. In the case of 
sensitive products, important tariff reductions are made by putting in place 
preferential access, but up to the limit of the quotas264. On the other hand, imports 
above the quota are heavily taxed265. Accordingly, imports of sensitive products 
are limited, via the introduction of tariff quotas266.  
 
11. Regionalism  
 
Some observers fear that the EPAs will inevitably give rise to the risk of division 
between the ACP countries267. The unity of the Group risks collapsing in the long 
term and economic disparities could arise even within the ACP regions, because of 
the different trade regimes which would be set up268. Developing countries has 
formed an ACP/AU/LDC alliance (also known as the G-90) in the WTO 
negotiations to defend their own development priorities269. In Cancun they 
signaled once and for all that the interests of small and vulnerable countries could 
no longer be ignored270. Yet, this alliance is under threat because it is much harder 
for ACP countries to maintain this resolve in the EPA negotiations, given their 
level of dependence on the EU for markets and development funds271. 
 
Further complications are presented by the fact that many ACP countries belong to 
more than one regional trade agreement, so for example among others African 
Union (AU), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAC), the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), the 
West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU), and the African 
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Development Bank (ADB)272. African regional integration is intended to promote 
the self-reliant development of African states by expanding markets, creating 
economies of scale and diversifying African economies273.  
However, yet through the EPA process African countries are being forced to 
choose one bloc through which to negotiate with the EU274. For example, in East 
and Southern Africa many countries have overlapping membership in the 
Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and SADC, in addition 
to smaller blocs like the EAC and Southern African Customs Union (SACU)275. 
For the purposes of EPAs, countries have had to choose whether to negotiate as 
SADC or COMESA, which means that some countries are placed in a difficult 
dilemma, and on-going processes towards intra-regional co-operation are being 
undermined276.  
 
The clustering of LDCs and non-LDCs within negotiating blocs is likely to 
produce even more difficulties because there are wide disparities between the 
costs and benefits of EPAs for different countries in the same group277. LDCs 
already have the Everything But Arms arrangement, which allows them to benefit 
from market access into the EU without reciprocating278. Therefore, the LDCs 
may have little incentive to open their markets to the EU on a preferential basis 
under an EPA279. In ECOWAS, for example, 14 out of the 16 member countries 
are LDCs280. Yet if these countries choose to opt out of an EPA, but continue with 
the ECOWAS regional integration process, they will still feel the effects of EU 
imports coming into their markets via their non-LDC regional neighbors281, or in 
the case of an EPA signed between the EU and regional blocs combining LDCs 
and non-LDCs the LDC ACP countries will experience an erosion of current 
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preferences, as both groups (LDCs and non-LDCs) will have the same conditions 
of access to the European market282. According to NGOs, the poorest countries 
therefore, are put in a no-win situation: either they maintain their non-reciprocal 
access to the European market under the Everything But Arms program but leave 
their regional grouping, or stick with their regional partners and open their market 
to the EU283. 
 
12. No alternatives 
 
NGOs doubt that the form of an FTA as the proposed EPAs is the only option 
open to ACP countries284. They accuse that the EU is refusing to look at 
alternatives to free trade EPAs285.  
 
Indeed, the European position is that EPAs provide the best way to achieve the 
development objectives of the Cotonou Agreement286. Therefore, unless a non-
LDC country expressed an interest in assessing ‘alternatives’ because it was not in 
a position to sign an EPA, the EC would not put any efforts into ‘alternatives’ or 
any economic assessment of them simply because any alternative would be an 
inferior solution to the envisaged EPAs287. Mr Mandelson, EC Commissioner for 
Trade, confirmed that any alternative to EPAs is, in the EC view, only the “second 
best”288. 
 
VII. ACP countries’ proposals and expectation 
 
In order to avoid the feared negative impacts which developing countries would have 
to face after the implementation of the EPAs in their proposed form by the EU, the 
                                                 
282 Alpha and others, p. 20, see footnote 43. 
283 Bond, see footnote 209. 
284 Among others f. i., Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
285 F. i., Oxfam, p. 5, see footnote 131. 
286 Bilal/Rampa, see footnote 145. 
287 Bilal/Rampa, see footnote 145. 
288 Bilal/Rampa, see footnote 145. 
 56
ACP countries as well as NGOs have made alternative proposals as to how to shape 
further ACP-EU trade relations.   
 
1. Implementation of the Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) provisions 
into the Article XXIV GATT289 
 
The ACP States submitted to the WTO on the 28th of April 2004 a proposal on 
“Developmental aspects of regional trade agreements and special and differential 
treatment in WTO rules: GATT 1994 Article XXIV and the Enabling Clause”290. 
The key objective in the ACP submission is to introduce SDT into GATT Article 
XXIV and in doing so, secure legal security of future EPAs with SDT from legal 
challenges as to their compatibility with WTO disciplines291. There are four key 
aspects of the ACP submission as follows292: 
 
a) Article XXIV:8(a)(i) and (b) on “substantially all the trade” in 
respect of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce; 
b) Article XXIV:5(c) and paragraph 3 of the 1994 Uruguay Round 
Understanding on this Article on the “reasonable period of time” 
in respect of the transition period for RTAs; 
c) Article XXIV:7 and paragraphs 7-10 of the 1994 Uruguay Round 
Understanding on notification, reporting and review of RTAs in 
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA); and 
d) Paragraph 12 of the 1994 Uruguay Understanding on dispute 
settlement. 
 
The aspects on “substantially all the trade” and the “reasonable period of time” are 
core pillars of the ACP’s submission293.  
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The submission contains following details294: 
 
(1) Regarding the SDT on “substantially all the trade” in respect of duties ACP’s 
submission proposes that appropriate flexibility shall be provided to 
developing countries in meeting the “substantially all the trade” requirement in 
respect of trade and product coverage. This can be provided through the 
application of a favourable methodology and/or lower (i.e. differentiated) 
threshold levels in the measurement of trade and product coverage of 
developing countries’ parties to a North-South RTA in meeting the 
Substantially all trade requirement. 
 
(2) Regarding the SDT on “substantially all the trade” in respect of other 
restrictive regulations of commerce the ACP propose to apply a flexible 
interpretation that allows developing countries’ members of a North-South 
RTA to apply contingency protection measures including safeguards and non-
tariff measures on intra-regional trade. While contributing to the clarification 
of WTO rules, this is aimed at preserving the right to apply trade defense 
measures in future EPAs, if needed.  
 
(3) The ACP proposal on SDT in respect of the transition period for RTAs is 
buttressed by the need for a secure and sufficient period that would facilitate 
smother integration and adjustment of ACP economies under EPAs. It is 
comprised of two aspects. First, the ACP submission seeks to clarify that the 
full provisions of an RTA (primarily the reciprocal free trade agreement) 
would become fully operational at the end of the transitional period – in other 
words, ACP States would not be required to liberalize fully or substantially at 
the start of the formation of an EPA, but towards its end date. Currently, there 
is no agreement among WTO members as to when exactly do the substantive 
disciplines of GATT 1994 Article XXIV start to apply to an RTA – at the 
beginning or at the end of the transition period. Second, the ACP proposal 
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seeks to ease the conditions under which a transition period of longer than 10 
years can be authorized and thus broadening the scope of the “exceptional 
circumstances” under which such extensions can be granted. It seeks to link 
the transition period to the trade, development and financial conditions of 
developing countries, so that the ACP States’ need for longer transition period 
under EPAs, which ACP States argue should not in any case be less than 18 
years, can be legally sanctioned under GATT Article XXIV.  
 
(4) The ACP submission proposes furthermore to introduce the SDT principle into 
the procedural requirements for notification, reporting and reviewing of 
regional trading agreements (GATT Article XXIV:7), with a view to 
facilitating these procedural requirements for developing countries and giving 
due consideration to developmental aspects when reviewing regional 
agreements. 
 
(5) The ACP submission also proposes that the compatibility of regional trading 
agreements should be determined only by the WTO Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements, thus removing the possibility of a challenge under the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, in an effort to obtain greater legal 
certainty. 
 
The proposal to reform GATT Article XXIV has also received the support of the 
Commission for Africa (2005), which calls, for instance, for a transition period of 
over 20 years to implement EPAs if necessary, a proposal also supported by the 
British government295. The African Union, the LDC Group and NGOs have also 
called for a revision of WTO rules296. 
 
2. Amending the Enabling Clause 
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Alternatively to the proposed changes to the Article XXIV GATT NGOs and ACP 
countries recommend to amend the enabling clause297. The enabling clause in its 
Article 2 states that the discrimination principle which is allowed in favor of 
developing countries applies also to the 
 
“Regional or global arrangements entered into amongst less-developed 
contracting parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and, in 
accordance with criteria or conditions which may be prescribed by the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES, for the mutual reduction or elimination of non-tariff 
measures, on products imported from one another; […]” 
 
NGOs propose therefore, that such not-fully-reciprocal FTAs which are allowed 
under the enabling clause could be amended to apply not only to the South-South 
FTAs but also to the North-South FTAs298.  
 
This option, however, is not very realistic. Indeed, such a revision of the Enabling 
Clause would seriously erode the principles of non-discrimination and most-
favoured nation (MFN) by allowing a developed partner to arbitrarily discriminate 
among developing countries while avoiding the more rigorous discipline of GATT 
Article XXIV, which justifies RTAs, raising serious systemic issues in regard to 
WTO rules299. As a consequence, such a reform is likely to arouse the strong 
opposition of many WTO members, including among developing countries300. 
  
3. Extension of the current preferences 
 
NGOs propose an extension of the ‘Everything But Arms Initiative’301 - however, 
it seems to be an unrealistic outcome because it would open the EU market also to 
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large and highly competitive developing countries302 -, or to find ways in the EU’s 
current GSP to allow for ACP interest to be taken into account303. One of the main 
advantages of this scenario is that the EU would justify it at the WTO not under 
Article XXIV GATT 1994, and thus, without the necessity of reciprocal 
liberalization, but under the Enabling Clause304. 
 
4. New waiver 
 
As a further alternative, a new waiver could be sought under the WTO305. 
However, it seems to be also an unrealistic approach. It is highly improbable that 
it will be possible for the EU to obtain a further waiver in order to provide ACP 
countries with preferences and in doing so to discriminate against other 
developing countries. As already stated above, it was a ‘hard fight’ for the EU to 
obtain this second waiver and it was granted only under the condition of creating a 
WTO compatible future trade regime in the EU-ACP trade relations. Both the EU 
and several WTO members seem unwilling to follow such an approach306. 
 
Furthermore, the nature of the waiver arrangement itself constitutes another 
serious problem307. Waivers are no longer of an indefinite duration and are subject 
to annual review308. This greatly diminishes the commercial value of any waiver 
arrangement as commercial interests will be unwilling to undertake new long term 
investments when trade arrangements can be so readily terminated309. Thus, it is 
extremely unlikely that a Lomé system that is subject to continual scrutiny and 
annual review will constitute a foundation for investment in ACP states310. 
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5. Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) 
 
There are suggestions from the ACP countries that it might also be possible to 
envisage a specific safeguard mechanism for EU imports within the EPA 
framework, to limit the consequences linked to an increase in EU imports after the 
introduction of reciprocity of preference311. The construction of such a mechanism 
could possibly be drawn from the definition of a SSM within the WTO contained 
in the Article 5 of the Agreement on Agriculture312, which allows countries to 
impose additional duties on the agricultural imports in the case of import 
surges313.  
 
6. ‘Sensitive products’ 
 
ACP countries governments are pushing for the designation of ‘Sensitive 
Products’ in both developing and developed countries, as the retention of higher 
tariffs on developed country Sensitive Products would benefit developing 
countries enjoying preferential market access in these products, protecting them 
against preference erosion314. 
 
7. Alternative EPAs 
 
There are suggestions to regard alternative EPAs. The basic principle of most of 
the alternative EPA scenarios is to stretch flexibility on the requirements for WTO 
compatibility (notably with regard to the level of reciprocity) as much as possible 
and/or to adjust the current EPA framework to better accommodate some 
development concerns315.  
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8. “Menu approach” 
 
As already discussed above, the ACP countries have repeatedly rejected the 
agreements on investment and competition, both in the context of the Doha Round 
of the WTO negotiations and in the context of the EPAs. Many civil observers and 
NGOs call to respect these wishes and propose that the different components of an 
EPA (trade in goods and in services, investment, possible sector-specific 
arrangements as in fisheries, and so forth) could be covered under separate 
individual agreements, and countries in one region would be offered a ‘menu’: all 
would sign a ‘master agreement’ establishing the principles to govern the EPA 
relationship but individual countries would be allowed to join only those specific 
‘subsidiary agreements’ they are prepared to commit to316. Potentially very 
different treatment of different countries under market-access arrangements (as 
well as non-trade areas) risks breaking up the ACP regions, and the WTO 
compatibility of such a scenario is, at best, uncertain317. 
   
VIII. Results so far 
 
The Economic Partnership Agreements’ negotiations were launched at all-ACP levels 
in September 2002318. In October 2003 the EPAs negotiations started with the regions 
of West and Central Africa, and in February 2004 with the regions of East and 
Southern Africa319.  
 
There are several phases in the EPAs negotiating process:  
 
1. Phase I 
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The first phase began in September 2002 between the EU and all ACP-countries 
negotiating as a bloc320. The talks in phase I concerned mere consultations 
between the parties on the framework and principles of EPA negotiations321. 
Whereas the ACP group wanted a formal agreement to conclude phase I, the 
European Commission rejected this, emphasizing that the purpose of the talks was 
to clarify issues rather than to reach a formal agreement322. In fact, the only 
concrete outcome of Phase I was a joint report outlining issues debated thus far323. 
 
There had been little agreement on many key issues between the ACP and the 
EU324. Issues that were still under discussion at the end of Phase I included: 
WTO-compatibility; the definition of the parties to the EPAs and the treatment of 
non-LDCs not entering into an EPA; rules of origin; technical barriers to trade 
(TBT) and sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) issues; safeguards, anti-dumping, 
and dispute settlement; commodity protocols; an ACP-EU framework agreement 
on fisheries; the fiscal, economic, balance of payments, and social implications of 
EPAs; and implementation mechanisms325. 
 
One issue with particularly important implications for the EPA negotiations is the 
question of financial resources to support the trade liberalization process in 
SSA326. The ACP group has argued that the financial resources currently available 
under the Cotonou Agreement are insufficient to support trade liberalization and 
expansion as well as the ACP countries’ other needs327. In response, the EU has 
stated that the amount of development finance available from it until 2008 under 
the 9th European Development Fund has already been set and is not open for 
renegotiation328.  
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2. Phase II 
 
The second phase has been ongoing since October 2003 at the respective ACP 
regional level for individual EPAs with the EU329. The six self-determined ACP 
regions are as follows330: 
 
Central Africa CEMAC (Communauté Economique et Monétaire 
de l’Afrique Centrale) plus Sao Tome and Principe
negotiations launched on 3 October 2003 
West Africa ECOWAS (Economic Community of West 
African States) plus Mauritania 
negotiations launched on 6 October 2003 
East and Southern Africa  an open configuration currently comprising 
COMESA countries minus Egypt and South Africa
negotiations launched on 7 February 2004 
Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland (BLNS) 
plus Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania 
negotiations launched on 8 July 2004 
CARIFORUM Caribbean Forum of ACP States  negotiations launched on 16 April 2004 
Pacific ACP States   negotiations launched on 10 September 
2004 
 
The regional negotiations take place independently from each other331.  
 
3. Phase III 
 
The third phase of the negotiations was launched on the 29th of September 2005 in 
the Caribbean and is expected to start in 2006 in the other regions332. It should 
address substantive issues, notably the specific structure and scope of each EPA, 
the approach to trade liberalization, as well as the drafting of legal provisions333. 
Negotiations on EPA legal texts are the focus for ACP-EU negotiators in 2006334. 
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Furthermore, as foreseen in the Article 37.4 Cotonou Agreement, “a formal and 
comprehensive review” of EPA negotiations will have to be carried out in 2006 
for all ACP countries335. In this context, the year 2006 will be crucial for the 
negotiations.  
 
To date, no ACP country has opted out of EPA negotiations336. Of course, countries 
can always withdraw from the negotiations and opt for an alternative at later stages337. 
In this respect, it is no surprise that even those ACP countries most reluctant to 
negotiate reciprocity have remained on board so far338.  
 
IX. Summery and conclusion 
 
More than three years after the start of negotiations (2002) there is no consensus 
between the parties on the practical way forward to integrate the development 
dimension into EPAs339. Rather, sharp differences still prevail on the approach to 
development in these negotiations, creating tensions and frustrations among the 
parties340. 
 
While the European Commission’s emphasis is towards trade liberalization and the 
creation of the right policy framework to attract investment, which according to the 
EU will foster development, the ACP governments emphasize that trade liberalization 
alone is not sufficient to create development and growth; rather trade liberalization 
should be accompanied by development support to address supply-side constraints, as 
well as related institutional and structural weaknesses341. 
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It is a stated fact that trade reforms can lead to efficiency gains, increased competition, 
lower prices, knowledge transfers and ultimately higher economic growth342. The 
question is therefore, whether the success of the trade liberalization predominantly 
demonstrated by the North-North trade relations (such as the EU) can be realized also 
by the North-South trade relations as planed in the case of EPAs?  
 
EU’s answer is a positive one. It alleges that by creating free trade areas with the EU, 
the ACP regions will benefit from the standard gains from trade: increased market 
access to the EU, reduced prices of EU imports for ACP consumers, and associated 
competitive effects should foster economic growth and hence development343. 
Therefore, as result trade creation occurs.  
 
Trade creation is the welfare improvement that arises because high-cost domestic 
production in the ACP region is replaced by lower-cost production in the EU344. Trade 
creation thus allows partner countries to better exploit their comparative advantage345. 
As markets are opened, both the ACP region and the EU further specialize their 
production, thereby serving the markets of partner countries with products at lower 
prices346. For the FTA as a whole, trade creation improves resource allocation and 
welfare.347  
  
However, it is questionable whether trade liberalization will automatically result in 
trade creation in ACP markets, as alleged by the EU. The major comparative 
advantage of the ACP countries is the agriculture. However, if the EU remains its 
CAP policy and keeps subsidizing its agricultural products, it is hard to believe that 
ACP countries could further specialize in the agricultural sector and compete with the 
European producers. Moreover, the full reciprocity will be very costly for Africa, in 
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terms of revenue losses, adjustment costs associated with de-industrialization, and its 
undermining effect of regional integration348.  
  
The effect would be therefore, not trade creation, as promulgated by the EU, but on 
the contrary, trade diversion. Trade diversion occurs when higher-cost imports from 
the EU as result of the new tariff-free system become cheaper and therefore, more 
favorable for the ACP consumers than the lower-cost imports from third countries349. 
Though ACP consumers gain from lower prices, economy-wide welfare is negatively 
affected because the tariff revenue that was previously yielded from the third-country 
imports is now lost350.  
 
The ACP governments have continuously stressed that high adjustment costs, which 
the African countries will have to bear as a result of revenue shortfalls351, may even 
negate the benefits from market liberalization through an EPA352.  
 
One of the EU’s objectives in the current EPA’s negotiating process is the 
continuation to provide aid for the ACP countries. Many ACP governments are 
holding on to the hope that EPAs will provide the means to address these supply-side 
problems353. Yet the stark reality is that the EU has persistently said that the funding 
available under the current EDF will not be substantially increased354. However, 
further trade liberalization, as planed in the framework of EPAs, will cause additional 
adjustment costs which point to the need for more resources, as accompanying 
measures to trade should not come at the expense of other legitimate (often more 
vital) development concerns already addressed through aid (e. g. infrastructure 
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development, education, health, etc.)355. The additionality of resources was therefore 
the most substantial disagreement of phase I of the EPA negotiations: Whereas the 
Commission finds that the funds agreed in the 9th European Development Fund (EDF) 
should suffice to address EPA-related concerns, the ACP pressed for extra 
commitments so as to safeguard the original allocation of the EDF to non-trade-
related area356.  
 
Also regarding the timetable envisaged by the European Union towards the beginning 
of 2008 there is no mutual understanding between the parties on how, in practical, 
operational terms, to ensure that the European Commission effectively implements its 
development policy and Cotonou Partnership Agreement’s commitments in a timely 
manner357.  
 
The experience which the European Union has undergone shows that trade 
liberalization process has taken much more time in Europe than EU has planed for the 
ACP countries. Even for middle income countries with substantial institutional 
capacity, dynamic leadership, and strong political support for reforms implementation 
of EPA alike programs would be a challenge358. For least developed and other low 
income countries with serious capacity constraints and lukewarm political support for 
reform, the list of actions envisaged is daunting359. A single mega-agreement with a 
10-12 year implementation period may be too demanding to negotiate and implement; 
in any case, especially SSA countries will need some time to mobilize the necessary 
political support and to develop the institutional capacity for the trade and related 
reforms that need to accompany the EPAs360.  
 
Also it is questionable whether the full trade liberalization will bring more than under 
the Lomé. Under the Lomé preferences ACP countries enjoyed a tax and duty free 
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market access but the results were not gratifying. So, why and how does the European 
Union expect better results due to the establishing of Free Trade Areas? If the ACP 
countries were not able to gain any profits under the trade preferences how would it be 
possible for them to obtain any positive results without any preferences but to 
compete on equal terms with European producers? It is hard to find a positive answer 
for this question, especially because some research and the past experiences are not 
promising - during the 80s and 90s due to Washington Consensus as result of the trade 
liberalization African and South American industries suffered enormous losses and 
damages - but in contrary, very discouraging.  
 
However, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) stated in 
its research paper361 that even with reciprocity, a free trade area that does not exclude 
sectors of export interest to Africa, and one that deals with non-tariff barriers, 
promises positive results for African countries; however, the sequencing of policy 
reforms by Africa is critical to the success of EPAs. It makes following 
suggestions362: 
 
Firstly, EPAs should focus on deepening intra-African trade. This will increase 
African producers’ competitiveness. Secondly, any tariff dismantlement by African 
countries will need to be implemented in phases, hand in hand with unrestricted 
market access for African exports into the EU market. Clearly, the 10-12 years under 
GATT Article XXIV is only sufficient for the deepening of the intra-African trade. 
The EPAs should look to seek more than 12 years for introducing reciprocity.  And 
thirdly, measures must be implemented to compensate ACP countries for high 
adjustment costs that African countries will have to bear as a result of revenue 
shortfalls. If no appropriate measures are put in place to forestall the macroeconomic 
imbalances that are likely to result from the falling revenues, the EPAs will have the 
possibility of undermining the developmental objectives of the African countries. 
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So far no clear alternatives to EPAs have been presented to ACP countries despite 
concerns by many of them over the need to start looking at different scenarios363.  
However, presenting alternatives is an important part of the Cotonou Agreement and 
as shown above, there are numerous suggestions by the ACP governments and NGOs. 
 
The most realistic alternative to EPAs (considered by many as the only real alternative 
to EPA, especially by EC officials) remains the preferential trade regime granted by 
Europe to all developing countries, known as the Generalized System of 
Preferences364. However, an unchanged application of the current GSPs will represent 
significant income losses for the ACP countries, as the GSP system is less favorable, i. 
e. the rules of origin are stricter than the current preferences under the Cotonou 
Agreement365. Of course, it is possible to avoid such negative effect if the EU is 
willing to extend the Cotonou arrangements for ‘cumulation’ (i. e. allowing several 
developing countries to contribute to production of a good) to the GSP rules of 
origin366, and indeed, the European Union must do so in order to fulfill its 
commitments contained in the Article 37.6 of the Cotonou Agreement. As already 
discussed above, the EU has committed itself in Article 37.6 of the Cotonou 
Agreement “[…] to provide [ACP] countries with a new framework for trade which is 
equivalent to their existing situation [...]”. If the EU offers, as intended, the ACP 
countries which are not willing or not able to sign an EPA as an alternative to import 
into the European market under the current European GSP which is less favorable 
than the rules of origin under the Cotonou Agreement this will not be “equivalent” to 
the “existing situation”, and thus, the EU will be in violation of the provisions of the 
Cotonou Agreement. The provision that every single non-LDC ACP state not party to 
an EPA has to be granted a regime equivalent to that which is enjoyed under Lomé IV 
could only be achieved by enhancing the preferences contained in the GSP of the 
Community by 2008, to the level of the trade preferences contained in Lomé IV or 
                                                 
363 Bilal/Rampa, see footnote 145. 
364 Bilal/Rampa, see footnote 145.  
365 Matthias Busse, Harald Großmann, „Assessing the Impact of ACP/EU Economic Partnership Agreement on West 
African countries“, HWWA Discussion Paper 294, p. 2, www.hwwa.de/Forschung/Publicationen/Discussion-
Paper/2004/294.pdf.  
366 Stevens, see footnote 116. 
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Cotonou Agreement respectively367. It would not be possible to build into the GSP 
special increased preferences for ACP states only, since a geographical differentiation 
between ACP states and other developing countries as such would be incompatible 
with a ‘generalized’ system of preferences which must be open to all developing 
countries according to objective criteria368. However, it would of course be possible to 
add new products on a non-discriminatory basis to the GSP, which are of particular 
importance to a certain number of ACP states369. The Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS) research indicates that this is technically feasible; political will is the 
only potential obstacle370. Moreover, IDS research suggests that in most cases the 
inclusion of these products in GSP+ would not significantly erode ACP 
preferences371. This is because some competitors will either be excluded from GSP+ 
or already enjoy duty-free access (now or within a few years) under one agreement or 
another372.  
 
Also the suggestions by the ACP countries’ governments and NGOs regarding the 
change of the WTO/GATT-rules must be seriously taken into consideration. The EU 
reacted to this proposal and submitted a paper in May 2005 on Article XXIV GATT in 
which it called for the RTA negotiations to work to achieve rules “that support the 
developmental impacts of RTAs”373. The paper acknowledged the need to take SDT 
principles into account however, it did not offer any concrete suggestions on 
implementation374. 
 
However, a reform of Article XXIV GATT, as requested by the ACP countries’ 
governments, might allow the ACP countries to limit their trade liberalization, and in 
                                                 
367 Huber, p. 436, see footnote 19. 
368 Huber, p. 436, see footnote 19. 
369 Huber, p. 437, see footnote 19. 
370 Stevens, see footnote 116. 
371 Stevens, see footnote 116. 
372 Stevens, see footnote 116. 
373 ICTSD, see footnote 314. 
374 ICTSD, see footnote 314; Onguglo, p. 5, see footnote 289. 
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doing so to reduce the risk associated with an increase in import competition from the 
EU following EPAs accords375.  
 
Regardless whether the suggestions presented by the ACP countries or NGOs 
respectively do represent effective alternatives to EPAs or do not they deserve 
thorough consideration and an open debate. Discussing alternatives will give the ACP 
governments a real choice and will bring more clearance into their autonomous 
decision-making-process. 
 
Despite all expressed concerns the positive effect of the EPAs is that these are 
‘agreements’, and therefore, as the name already implies, will be negotiated on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis. This represents an enormous advantage to the ACP 
countries. In comparison, the EBA initiative, for example, is not a negotiated 
agreement and can therefore, be amended or changed or withdrawn at any time 
unilaterally by the EU. The same applies also to the envisaged alternative under the 
GSP system: The GSP is an autonomous EU action; not only can it be reversed at any 
time, but the new regime just created applies only until 2008, creating great 
uncertainty over what will happen thereafter376. Thus, ACP countries can influence 
the EPAs negotiating process and must do so in order to make sure that their interests 
are best defended and taken into account, and that the European Union fulfils its 
commitments, in particular regarding the extent and the form of the SDT contained in 
the future EPAs, and regarding the alternative trading arrangements. As Dr. Sanoussi 
Bilal377 said: “ACP countries and regions should not feel obliged to sign onto an 




   
 
                                                 
375 Alpha and others, see footnote 256. 
376 Stevens, see footnote 116.  
377 Dr. Bilal, one of the authors of the ECDPM report on the alternatives to EPAs, see footnote 145. 
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